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Abstract 
According to the aims of the labour market reforms of the 90s implemented in many European 
countries, workers may stay at their first job for a shorter time, but should be able to switch jobs 
easily. This  would  generate  a trade-off between job  opportunities  and job stability.  This  paper 
addresses this issue using administrative longitudinal data for Germany and Italy, two countries 
which  have  undergone  changes  in  regulations  that  can  be  summarised  under  the  header  of 
“deregulation”.The estimated piecewise constant job and employment duration models show that 
changes  in  the  durations  of  the  first  job  and  employment  -  measured  as  the  sum  of  multiple 
consecutive jobs - are observed in periods of labour market reforms. However, the existence of a 
trade-off  is  not  confirmed  by  the  results.  In  Germany,  men  have  experienced  an  increase  in 
employment stability over time, mated with somewhat longer job durations, while women have not 
benefitted from an increase in employment durations as a compensation for the marked decrease in 
their first job durations. In Italy, employment stability of the new entrants of both sexes has not 
improved  after  the  reforms.  The  reduction  in  the  duration  of  the  first  job  has  not  been 
counterbalanced by an increase in the opportunity to find rapidly another job. These results suggest 
that the objective of increasing job opportunities by means of labour market deregulation has not 
been fully achieved. 
 
JEL: J62, J64, J68, K31, C41  
Keywords:  employment  duration,  work  career,  tenure,  precarious  jobs,  labour  market  reforms, 
mixed proportional hazard 
 
Acknowledgements: in 2009 we presented an earlier version of this paper at the AIEL, EALE, ILO conferences and at 
PSI (London). We wish to thank Alfonso Arpaia, Simone Bertoli, Marco Caliendo, Bruno Contini, Riccardo Del Punta, 
Debra  Hevenstone,  Anton  Nivorozhkin,  Lia  Pacelli,  Matteo  Picchio  and  Joachim  Wolff  for  very  helpful  and 
constructive  comments.  A  visiting  fellowship  in  July  2008  at  DG  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  in  Brussels  to 
develop this research project is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
Contact address: 
Gianna Claudia Giannelli 
Department of Economics 
University of Florence 
Via delle Pandette 9 
50127 Firenze 
e-mail: giannelli@unifi.it   - 2 - 
1 Introduction 
“È la flessibilità la vera arma contro la precarietà.”
1  
This paper deals with the issue of flexibility that has recently dominated the scene of labour market 
changes,  namely,  the  growing  tendency  of  labour  to  lose  its  permanent  features.  The  general 
framework concerns the trade-off between job stability and employment opportunities for the new 
entrants into the labour market and this paper aims at contributing to the theme of the choice of 
labour market regulations for reconciling stability with flexibility. The first question addressed is if 
labour market reforms aimed at easing entry into the labour market and reducing unemployment 
have actually led to a decrease in job stability of the new entrants. Then, from the job concept, the 
focus is turned to the employment concept, namely, to what happens to the new entrants’ careers 
after the first job has elapsed. The problem is whether employment, defined as a series of job spells 
only interrupted by short periods of search, has increased or decreased in stability during - and after 
-  the  years of labour market  reforms.  Is  it true that more  job  opportunities have been created, 
especially for a vulnerable group like the new entrants, thus favouring the stability of employment 
at the expense of the duration of single jobs?  
 
The objective of the analysis is to ascertain whether the reforms can be related to changes in young 
people’s job stability in terms of the duration of their employment and to compare the outcomes of 
the strategies towards flexibility of two European countries, Germany and Italy which, during the 
90s and the early 2000's, have undergone changes in regulations which can be summarised under 
the header of “deregulation”. A common feature of the reforms adopted in Germany and in Italy is 
that they took place mainly through a series of legislative changes that only affected newly entered 
workers - the marginal increase of the employment stock - leaving the legislation concerning insider 
workers and the terms and conditions of their open-end contracts largely unchanged. 
In both countries, the major goals of the reforms were to stimulate new hires and to ease mobility 
between jobs. In Germany, however, the reforms consisted in modifications to an already existing 
legislation for non-standard working contracts and for dismissal protection. In Italy, the reform 
process appears to be concentrated in a handful of laws that were mainly focussed on easing the use 
of flexible working contracts, nearly forbidden by the preceding legislation. For the period under 
                                                 
1 “Flexibility is the real weapon against precariousness.” Antonio D’Amato, president of Confindustria, Italy’s 
main employers’ association, in his address to the annual assembly of Confindustria in 2003, referring to Biagi's 
law (see Section 3).   - 3 - 
study, an interesting feature of the German reforms is a partial (and temporary) reversal towards 
more regulation after the parliamentary elections in 1998. 
 
The method of analysis is based on the study of durations of first jobs and employment in the new 
entrants’ careers. The research strategy consists of two steps: i) testing the hypothesis of a tendency 
towards shorter first job durations of the new entrants during the period of labour market reforms 
and ii) addressing the issue of the scope of the reforms, namely, the creation of more employment 
opportunities  to  reduce  the risk  of unemployment. The analysis  is  therefore extended  from  the 
duration of the first job to the duration of the first employment, considering as first employment 
spell an uninterrupted - or shortly interrupted - period of employment in different job spells, also 
with different employers. The idea is to test, for example, if a short first job is rapidly followed by 
another job and if this type of job mobility has become more common in the period analysed. Such 
an observation would indicate an increase in job opportunities over the period under study. As to 
the  econometric  technique,  mixed  proportional  hazards  models  with  constant  time  pieces  and 
unobserved heterogeneity are employed for the analysis of job and employment durations. 
 
The  data  used  for  both  countries  are  drawn  from  the  archives  of  the  national  social  security 
contributions for dependent employment, IABS for Germany and WHIP for Italy, respectively. 
These are longitudinal data that allow reconstructing the workers’ careers from their first entry into 
the labour market. The data show a high degree of comparability and have the further advantage of 
a large number of observations after the sample selection.  
 
This  paper  aims  at  contributing  to  the  existing  literature  in  several  ways.  First,  it  presents  a 
comparative micro-analysis of job and employment stability in Germany and Italy for cohorts of 
new entrants during the 90s up to the early 2000s who are followed thereafter for three years. To the 
authors’ knowledge, this is the first comparative study on job and employment durations conducted 
on  two  sets  of  administrative  micro  data.  Second,  it  proposes  a  method  to  measure  the  job 
opportunities versus stability trade-off using the concepts of job and employment durations. Third, 
while trying to find a relation between job/employment stability and the reforms, it also compares 
different reform strategies adopted in two different labour market regimes. Fourth, it addresses the 
issue of stability for the whole group of entrants into the labour market,  whereas the focus of 
existing studies on this subject has been mainly on atypical employment.  
 
The analysis leaves room for further research on at least two grounds which have not been dealt 
with. First, the question whether sequences of shorter job spells, even if leading to longer total   - 4 - 
durations in employment, might have detrimental consequences for the accumulation of human 
capital. Second, the question of how unemployment incidence and unemployment duration of new 
entrants have changed during the period under study. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the evaluation of labour 
market reforms in general and, in particular, for Germany and Italy. Section 3 gives an account of 
the institutional background of labour market reforms in Germany and Italy. Section 4 describes the 
data sources. Section 5 presents the model and  the results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2 The literature 
 
Recently, economists have analysed the important changes occurred since the 90s in the European 
labour markets focusing on the effects of the institutional reforms on the level and structure of 
employment, the performance of firms and the workers’ well being. The available literature, both 
macro and micro, is rich, but, given the complexity of the issues at stake, the results are far from 
giving uncontroversial answers, as the following short survey of the literature shows. 
 
As to the use of duration to measure job stability, Booth et al. (1999), using work-history data over 
the period 1915-1990 from the British Household Panel Survey, find that separation hazards were 
higher for more recent cohorts, implying a secular increase in job instability, particularly marked in 
the  lowest  occupational  classification.  Duration  of  the  first  job  is  also  used  as  an  indicator  of 
potential precariousness. Cockx and Picchio (2009), for example, find for Belgium that (fe)male 
school-leavers accepting a short-lived job are, within two years, 13.4 (9.5) percentage points more 
likely to find a long-lasting job than in the counterfactual in which they reject short-lived jobs. 
Scherer’s (2005), in the only study close to the research question of this paper, uses survey data to 
compare job durations of school leavers in Italy (1983-1997), Great Britain and West Germany 
(1993-1998). Differentiating between first and first stable job, Scherer finds that labour market 
entry may be characterized as rapid but unstable in Great Britain, rapid and relatively stable in 
Germany  and  very  protracted  and  -  given  an  entry  -  rather  stable  in  Italy.  She  concludes  that 
attempts for deregulation alone will not be sufficient to ease labour market entry.  
 
As noted in the introduction, the literature concentrates on labour market outcomes of workers with 
atypical working contracts or of workers affected by changes in dismissal protection. In Germany, 
there  is  micro  evidence  for  several  legislative  changes  concerning  the  flexibility  of  working   - 5 - 
contracts. Boockmann and Hagen (2008), for example, estimate the effect of initial episodes under 
fixed term contracts on job duration in the further course of the employment spell, using data from 
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) from 1985 to 2002. They find that job exit rates are 
initially much higher if the employment spell began with a fixed term contract. However, exit rates 
fall below those of comparable spells spent entirely in permanent employment after a few years 
time. They interpret this result in the sense that fixed terms contracts accelerate the sorting process 
of probationary periods. Another focus of labour market deregulation has been the introduction of 
temporary agency work. Based on the IABS and estimating duration models including time-varying 
covariates for periods in which labour market reforms took place, Antoni and Jahn (2009) conclude, 
that the extension of the maximum length of loan periods did increase employment durations in 
temporary  work  agencies.  The  study  of  Kvasnicka  (2008)  also  relies  on  the  IABS.  Using  the 
evaluation approach by Sianesi (2004), Kvasnicka constructs matched samples stratified by duration 
of unemployment before taking up work in a temporary agency. His results imply that temporary 
agency work does not serve as a stepping stone to regular work (the chances to get a regular job do 
not change over time). For Italy, Gagliarducci (2005) analyses the effects of a temporary first job 
applying a duration model with competing risks and multiple transitions. He finds that the length of 
the first temporary contract positively influences the probability of getting a permanent job. The 
study  of  Ichino,  Mealli  and  Nannicini  (2008)  on  the  effects  of  temporary  agency  work  finds 
diverging results within Italy (a sensitivity analysis confirms positive effects in Tuscany, but rejects 
significance for Sicily). Berton, Devicienti and Pacelli (2007) look at labour market transitions of 
young entrants in Italy. They find that heterogeneity partially explains workers' sorting between 
types of contract. Different kinds of temporary contracts are found to have different effects on the 
probability of getting a permanent job: temporary jobs represent a port of entry towards permanent 
employment mainly within, but not across firms. 
 
Both in Italy and in Germany, the effect of dismissal protection has been studied by exploiting the 
fact that small firms beneath a certain threshold of employees are exempted from the dismissal law. 
In Germany, this threshold has been increased in 1996 to the level of ten employees and then set 
back to five employees under the new government in 1999 (see next section). While a study of 
Bauer et al. (2007) does not find clear effects of these reforms on the dismissal and hiring behaviour 
of firms, Boockmann et al. (2008) analyse individual employment durations in combination with 
establishment information for firms with six to ten employees (for whom the threshold has been 
changed) within a differences-in-differences approach and find a positive influence of dismissal 
protection on employment stability. Boeri and Jimeno (2005) look at the effects of the threshold 
value  exempting  small  firms  from  strict  dismissal  protection  in  Italy.  They  find  that  dismissal   - 6 - 
probabilities are indeed higher for workers in firms with less restrictive employment protection. 
Looking at the size distribution of firms over time, they cannot identify an impact of the 1990 
reform tightening employment protection by making severance pay mandatory for small firms.  
 
3 Institutional background 
 
According to the OECD indexes (OECD 1999), both Germany and Italy, together with many other 
European countries, have undergone a significant process of relaxation of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) between the second half of the 80’s and the late 90’s. In these two countries, as in 
most of Europe, this process has mainly regarded temporary employment, since EPL in permanent 
employment remained nearly unchanged in this period
2 (see OECD 1999, Table 2.2, p. 57). Both in 
Germany and in Italy, the reforms have introduced a “two-tier system” (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007), 
as the increase in labour market flexibility took place mainly through legislative changes that only 
affected newly entered workers. 
The process of deregulation in Germany has started earlier than in Italy. As a result, Germany 
shows a higher level of flexibility than Italy already from the start, the positive gap persisting until 
the end of the period (see OECD 1999, Table 2.3, p. 63). 
 
Tables 1 and 2 give an overview of the reforms in the two countries. The focus is on employment 
protection legislation, which includes reforms of dismissal protection laws, reforms of temporary 
work (both fixed term and agency) and reforms regarding the payment of social contributions. For 
Germany, two periods may be defined. The first period begins in 1985 and ends in 1998, together 
with  the  sixteen  years'  government  of  Helmut  Kohl,  the  “Kohl  era”.  In  this  period,  several 
modifications in the conditions of fixed-term contracts (1985, 1996) and of temporary agency work 
(1985, 1994 and 1997) were undertaken. As already noted in the previous section, the scope of the 
dismissal protection law was limited to firms with more than 10 (previously: 5) employees in 1996. 
In the second period, starting with the parliamentary elections in 1998 and the formation of the red-
green coalition under chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the first reform in 1999 reform takes back the 
1996 changes in the dismissal protection law. The second reform in 2001, besides of establishing 
new  rules  for  non-discrimination  of  part-time  work,  restricted  the  use  of  fixed-term  contracts 
without objective reason. While this represents "more" employment protection, new as well as older 
workers  are  excluded.  Furthermore,  the  list  of  objective  reasons  for  fixed-term  contracts  was 
extended.  Thus,  entrants  after  vocational  training  or  university  can  be  hired  in  fixed-term 
                                                 
2 With the exception of Spain where the overall strictness of protection against dismissals in permanent employment 
shows a significant drop.   - 7 - 
employment without the need of any further objective reason. Because of the tendency to take back 
earlier  reforms  of  the  Kohl  era,  the  second  period  is  termed  "reregulation"  as  opposed  to  the 
preceding period of "deregulation". 
 
Even if beyond the observation window defined for this paper, there should be a remark on the 
“Hartz” reforms. These reforms, provoked by the “placement affair” (Vermittlungsskandal)
3 in the 
Federal Employment Services and implemented from 2002 to 2005, comprised a number of changes 
in active labour market policies, programmes  as well as fundamental institutional changes. Thus, 
the present analysis should not be taken as an evaluation of these latter reforms. 
 
As to Italy, since the mid 90s, the Italian labour market has undergone  important reforms towards 
flexibility. The reforms have substantially liberalised temporary agency work – introduced for the 
first time in Italy, several years after Germany and France - fixed term contracts and regulated the 
use of independent collaborators to perform ordinary tasks. Table 2 summarises the changes in 
employment protection legislation for Italy.  
Fixed  term  contracts  were  nearly  absent  in  Italy  since  1962  (Law  n.  230),  which  stated  that 
permanent contracts should be the norm while fixed term contracts could be applied only in  a 
number of objective reasons listed in the law. Examples of these objective reasons were temporary 
replacement of workers in maternity or sickness leaves and some types of seasonal occupations, 
mostly  in  agriculture.  Fixed  term  contracts  started  to  be  liberalized  in  1987,  when  Law  n.  56 
allowed the possibility that both the objective reasons for their application and the percentage of 




In 1995, Law n. 335 extended compulsory payment by employers of social contribution to external 
independent collaborators
5. This reduced the cost advantage of hiring an external  (independent) 
collaborator instead of an employee with a fixed term contract.  Anyway, the cost gap remained in 
favour of external collaborators – severance payments, holiday, sickness and other allowances not 
                                                 
3 The numbers of successful placements in the official statistics of the Federal Employment Services had proved to be 
exaggerated. 
4 For example the bargained percentage was 10 per cent in the collective contract for metal workers signed in 1998. 
5 This is a form of employment which had been introduced for the first time in 1973 with Law n. 533. It is an 
employment relation which is halfway between dependent and independent employment. It is similar to dependent 
employment  because  the  worker  performs  tasks  for  the  same  firm  for  a  continuous  period  –  a  “continuous” 
collaboration - this being often his/her only source of labour income. However, the worker remains self-employed, 
being his/her collaboration with the firm only “coordinated” and not managed by the employer. For these reasons these 
workers are termed “coordinated and continuous collaborators” (co. co. co.).    - 8 - 
being due. However, the law was progressively reformed
6 to avoid the abuse of these contracts for 
performing ordinary tasks, in such a way that the firm would incur the risk of sanctions (conversion 
to an open end contract, for example) after a legal action on the part of the “co. co.co.” worker. 
 
The Treu measures in 1997 (Law 197/1997), named after then-Labour Minister Tiziano Treu, were 
the first legislative measures explicitly aimed at increasing the employment rate, particularly in the 
South, and overall labor market flexibility. The Treu law introduced temporary agency contracts 
and provided incentives for part-time. The law states that the application of these contracts should 
be bargained by the most representative unions in sectoral collective agreement. The renewal of the 
contracts, which practically enforced the temporary agency work, took place in 1998. 
 
A complete liberalization of fixed term contracts occurred in 2001 with the Law decree n. 368. The 
decree,  which  carried  out  the  Council  Directive  1999/70/EC  of  28  June  1999  concerning  the 
framework agreement on fixed-term work, , introduces a general clause according to which a fixed 
term contract can be applied for “technical, productive, organisational and substitution reasons”. 
 
 
The Biagi Law in 2003
7, has started the second phase of the flexibili sation process, introducing 
other tools for easing the hiring process for firms ( work  on call, staff leasing, new probation 
contracts).  Note that the data set used ends in 2003: the effects of this reform go beyond the 
observation window and thus are not included in the analysis. 
 
Compared to Germany,  in Italy  the number of laws  directly affecting labour  flexibility is  much 
more limited, amounting to just one in the period under study. 
 
Table 1. Labour market regulations concerning employment protection, Germany 1985-2001. 
 
DEREGULATION       
Year  Month  Reform  Type of Measure 
1985  5  Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz    Permission of fixed-term contracts without objective reason for new hires 
with a maximum duration of 18 months (24 months for new firms) 
  Extension of the maximum loan period in temporary work agencies from 
3 to 6 months) 
1990  1  Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz 
1990 
  Prolongation  of  regulations  for  fixed-term  contracts  and  temporary 
agency work 
                                                 
6 For example with decree with the force of law 10
th September 1991 n. 303. 
7 Named after Marco Biagi, an Italian labour law and industrial relations expert murdered by terrorists in 2002.    - 9 - 
1994  1  Erstes Gesetz zur Umsetzung des 
Spar-,  Konsolidierungs-  und 
Wachstumsprogramms  (1. 
SKWPG) from December 1993 
  Extension of the maximum loan period in temporary work agencies from 
6 to 9 months) 
  Permission of synchronization of fixed-term contract in temporary work 
agency and first assignment for hard-to-place unemployed 
1994  8  Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz 
1994 
  Prolongation  of  regulations  for  fixed-term  contracts  and  temporary 
agency work 
1996  10  Arbeitsrechtliches  Beschäfti-
gungsförderungsgesetz 1996 
  Maximum duration of fixed-term contracts extended to 24 months 
  Permission  of  chain  contracts  in  fixed-term  employment:  up  to  three 
prolongations within maximum duration possible 
  Permission of fixed-term contracts without objective reasons for workers 
of age 60 and more 
  Fixed-term  contracts  after  a  vocational  training  in  the  same  firm 
facilitated (elimination of requirement for employer to argue with lack of 
permanent job for the trainee) 
  Change  in  employee  threshold  defining  the  scope  of  the  dismissal 
protection law (from more than 5 to more than 10 employees) 
  Restriction of criteria for "social choice" in case of layoffs 
1997  4  Arbeitsförderungsreformgesetz 
AFRG  (Reform  of  the  old 
Labour  Placement  Act  AFG; 
Modification  of  the  law 
regulating  temporary  agency 
work;  Arbeitnehmerüberlas-
sungsgesetz AÜG) 
  Extension of the maximum loan period in temporary work agencies from 
9 to 12 months) 
  Permission of one-time fixed-term contract in temporary work agencies; 
prolongation allowed if the new contract follows without interruption 
  Permission  of  one-time  synchronization  of  fixed-term  contract  in 
temporary work agency and first assignment 
REREGULATION       
1999  1  Gesetz  zu  Korrekturen  in  der 
Sozialversicherung  und  zur 
Sicherung  der 
Arbeitnehmerrechte 
(Korrekturgesetz) 
  Withdrawal of 1996 change in employee threshold defining the scope of 
the dismissal protection law  
  Withdrawal of 1996 change in criteria for "social choice" in the case of 
dismissals because of economic reasons 
2001  1  Gesetz  über  Teilzeitarbeit  und 
befristete  Arbeitsverträge  (part-
time and fixed-term employment 
act;  replaces  the  former 
Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz) 
  Non-discrimination of part-timers (harmonization with EU law) 
  Part-time work may be requested by employees - employer has to find 
counterarguments 
  Non-discrimination of fixed-term employees 
  Permission of fixed-term employment without objective reasons for new 
employees 
  Extension of the list of objective reasons for fixed-term contracts 
  Prolongation of fixed-term contracts (at most three prolongations up to a 
total contract length of two years) possible only for new employees 
  Permission of fixed-term contracts without objective reasons for persons 
of age 58 and more   - 10 - 
Table 2. Labour market regulations concerning employment protection, Italy 1985-2001. 
Year  Month  Reform  Type of Measure 
1987  2  Norme  sull’organizzazione  del 
mercato del lavoro, legge n. 56 
  Introduction of new objective reasons for the application of fixed term 
contracts  
  Fixation in sectoral collective agreements of a maximum percentage of 
new hires with fixed term contracts 
1995  8  Riforma del sistema pensionistico 
obbligatorio e complementare, 
legge n. 335 
  Extension of compulsory social security to coordinated and continuous 
collaborators,  “co.  co.  co”,  and  freelance  workers.  Payment  by 
employers of 2/3 of social contributions. Contribution initially set to 
10% of the pay (progressively increased afterwards, up to 26.7% in 
2010, while  for dependent employment  they are set to 32.7%)  
1997  6  Norme in materia di promozione 
dell'occupazione, legge n. 196, 
Treu law 
 
  Introduction of temporary agency work. Enforcement in 1998 after the 
renewal of sectoral collective agreements 
  Incentives to part-time work and working hours reduction 
  Regulation of chain contracts in fixed-term employment. Conversion 
to permanent if a new fixed term contract is signed before the 20
th or 
the 30
th day from the end of the previous one for contracts shorter or 
longer than six months respectively 
 
2001  9  Attuazione della direttiva 
1999/70/CE relativa all'accordo 
quadro sul lavoro a tempo 
determinato, decreto legge n.368, 
2001. 
 
  Abrogation of law 230/1962 and  liberalisation of fixed term contracts 





4 Data sources  
The study makes use of two large  administrative data sets based on the records of employers’ 
declarations of employees for payment of social security contributions. These records cover all 
persons with a working episode subject to social security contributions at least once in their career. 
For Italy, this condition excludes employment in the public sector and  some categories of self-
employees (lawyers or notaries) – who have an autonomous security fund. From 1996 on, also 
freelance workers without any other security fund and coordinated and continuous collaborators 
(co.co.co – see section 3) have been included. For Germany, this excludes civil servants employed 
as  "Beamte"
8,  self-employed and persons  in "mini-jobs"
9  before 1999, as their employment is 
exempt  from  obligatory  social  security  contributions.   In  addition,  working  episodes  in  East 
Germany taking place before reunification are not recorded. 
                                                 
8 Other public sector employees are included. The status of Beamte is a special feature of public services in Germany. 
Beamte  are  traditionally  seen  as  representatives  of  the  state,  they  are  usually  life-time  employed  -  without 
unemployment insurance - and have pensions payed out of the public budget. 
9 The term "mini-jobs" is used for jobs with a regular working time below a certain threshold of hours per week, jobs  
with earnings below a certain monthly wage and jobs lasting only a short period. After 1999, these jobs have been made 
subject to (some) social security payments and now are included in the administrative data.   - 11 - 
 
The use of these data offers a number of advantages. First, the two data sets are highly comparable 
with respect to the nature and the structure of the information contained. Second, administrative 
data guarantee a precise recording of the timing of work episodes as compared to work histories 
based on recall data. Third, they offer a high number of observations, good for conducting finer 
analyses. Among the disadvantages, the most relevant one is that they contain a limited number of 
individual  characteristics,  in  particular  with  respect  to  family  background  and  household 
composition. 
 
For Germany, the data are drawn from the individual administrative data collected at the Institute 
for Employment Research (IAB), Nürnberg. The IAB Employment Samples (IABS) represent a 2 
per  cent  sample  of  persons  employed  from  1975  to  2004  and  contain  information  on  the 
employment history of employees liable to social security on a daily basis.
10  
 
For Italy,  the data are drawn from  the WHIP (Work History Italian Panel) w hich is a sample 
collection extracted from the Italian National Institute of Social Security (INPS )
11.  The  WHIP 
represents a sample of about 1 per cent (sampling ratio 1:90) of all the people (Italian and foreign) 
who have worked in Italy even only for a part of their working career from 1985 to 2003. For each 
of these people all episodes of their working careers are observed if they are enrolled in private, 
self-employment or atypical contracts, but also if they are in retirement spells or non-working spells 
in which they receive social benefits (i.e. unemployment or  “mobility” benefits, namely benefits 
ruled by Law 1991 n.223 for dismissed employees).  
 
5 The empirical strategy 
 
To start with, the hypotheses to be tested are set out. Then the econometric model and the sampling 
strategy adopted are described. Thereafter, some descriptive evidence of the duration of the first job 
spell in different periods and by gender is presented. This will give an impression of the data for 
both countries and allow for a first assessment of whether there have been changes in the duration 
of the first job over time. Finally, the results of the job/employment duration analysis are presented.  
 
5.1 The hypotheses to test 
                                                 
10 The IABS also contains data on unemployment benefit receipt drawn from the Federal Employment Agency, which is 
however not exploited in this paper. 
11 The data is managed by LABORatorio Revelli thanks to an agreement between the INPS and the University of 
Torino.   - 12 - 
 
As it has been discussed, in Germany as well as in Italy, several reforms enforced during the 90s 
have to be considered as influential for the labour market opportunities of the new entrants.  
Both countries had been suffering for several years of persistently high unemployment and one 
major  goal  of  the  reforms  was  to  reduce  it.  Administrative  data,  recording  the  first  entry  into 
employment without any information on individuals’ previous history (e.g. periods spent out of the 
labour force or in unemployment), does not allow to investigate the issue whether reforms have 
increased entry into the labour market. The focus is therefore on another relevant aspect, that is, the 
stability  of  employment  after  entry,  through  the  estimation  of  models  of  job  and  employment 
duration  of  workers  entering  the  labour  market  for  the  first  time.  The  first  three  years  of 
employment of workers who entered the labour market in the years 1994 to 2001 are followed for 
Germany, and 1990 to 2000 for Italy, where the choice of these periods is dictated by the time 
pattern of reforms described in the previous section.
12 
 
The first hypothesis to test is whether jobs for the new entrants into the labour market have become 
less stable in periods of labour market reforms that have liberalized the duration of contracts. By 
“less stable” it is meant here “of shorter duration” compared to the duration of jobs of people who 
entered the labour market at the beginning of the 90s.  
 
The loss in stability of the first job would have been compensated, in the intentions of policy 
makers, by the gain in the opportunities to find a new job enhanced by the liberalization of the 
duration of labour contracts. Thus, another question is whether workers, after the reforms, were able 
to switch jobs more easily than before the reforms. To test this hypothesis, each worker’s durations 
of multiple consecutive jobs are summed up into an overall employment duration, which becomes 
the dependent variable of the second estimated model. In case a worker experiences a spell of 
unemployment after the first job, his/her first employment duration will coincide with his/her first 
job  duration.  Thus,  the  reforms  may  be  claimed  to  have  been  successful  if  the  duration  of 
employment has increased after the reforms, even if the first job has a shorter duration. These are all 
testable predictions, and the main objective of this piece of analysis is to investigate the direction of 
changes in employment durations as compared to the direction of changes in job durations. 
 
5.2 The econometric model 
 
                                                 
12 For Germany, the first years of the 90s are excluded because considered a transition period after reunification.    - 13 - 
To analyse how labour market reforms have affected the durations of the first job and of the first 
spell of employment (formed by multiple consecutive jobs) a mixed proportional hazard rate model 
(see e. g. Lancaster 1990) is estimated. For the estimation of the hazard function the variable (t) that 
measures either the duration of the first job or of the first employment spell is defined. A flow-
sampling scheme is adopted, according to which each individual is selected upon entry into the first 
job/employment, at which point its individual clock is set to zero, and followed over a fixed time 
interval. Hence, left censoring is eliminated by construction, but right censoring exists and is taken 
into account. 
 
First  job/employment  durations  for  the  N  individuals  are  modelled  with  a  specification  which 
allows for period-specific differences in the risk of job exit, namely, a piecewise constant mixed 
proportional  hazard  rate  model.  The  single-spell  model  where  each  spell  corresponds  to  an 
individual i is the following: 
) exp( ) ( ) | (     i 0 i ij x t x t    i=1,…,N; j=1,…, J  (1) 
 
which is a multiplicative model of the hazard, where the first term is: 
 
j t    ) ( 0  with  j 1 j t          (2)  
 
that is,  ) ( 0 t   is the baseline hazard that depends on duration t, where the  j   are J constant time 
pieces to be estimated. In this case the baseline hazard  ) ( 0 t  is constant with J different values. The 
jth interval starts at duration  1 j   and ends at duration  j  . The  j   are the points where there are 
discrete changes in the baseline hazard. In the jth interval the baseline hazard is constant and equal 
to  j  . The second term depends on  i x , a set of individual, firm and macroeconomic time invariant 
explanatory variables which are specific of the individual at the moment of entry in the labour 
market (e.g. the age of individual i at entry, the size of the firm where individual i is employed, the 
growth rate of the valued added in the region of residence and year of entry of each individual i and 
so on).  
 
The administrative register starts recording individual and firm characteristics at the time of entry. 
No  information  is  available  on  earlier  pre-employment  periods  or  on  previous  employment 
experiences  different  from  dependent  employment  in  the  private  sector.  This  might  raise  the 
problem of self-selection, since the characteristics of potential workers who do not enter the labour 
market are not observed. However, as shown by Ridder (1984, p. 62) under the hypothesis that the   - 14 - 
probability to flow into employment is separable into observable and unobservable characteristics, 
there need not be problems of initial conditions.  
 
Duration analysis produces incorrect results, both on the estimated duration dependence and on the 
estimated effects of the covariates, if unobserved heterogeneity is ignored. For instance, Lancaster 
and Nickell (1980) show that unobserved heterogeneity in a proportional-hazards model gives rise 
to spurious negative-state dependence, that is,  even if the baseline hazard is constant, negative 
duration dependence is observed. To control for the effect of selection due to unobservable factors 
in  the  survival  process,  an  individual-specific  heterogeneity  term  i  ,  which  represents  the 
cumulative effect of one or more omitted variables, is introduced multiplicatively in the hazard 
function. Lancaster (1979) has proposed for the first time the use of a gamma distribution in a study 
of duration of unemployment and this result has been recently generalised by Abbring and Van den 
Berg (2007). Following this approach the model then becomes: 
i i 0 i i ij x t x t       ) exp( ) ( ) , | (      (3) 
 
where  i   has a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance θ. The survival function is then 
obtained by integrating out the unobservable  i   and θ, the variance of  i  , can be estimated. 
 
The effect of reforms is captured by dummy variables included in xi for the year of entry into the 
first  job  (employment).  The  coefficients  for  these  dummy  variables  indicate  changes  in  the 
dependent variable for different cohorts of entrants over time and hence should reflect whether the 
reforms had an influence on job and employment durations.  The method is very similar to the 
strategy adopted in Antoni and Jahn (2009) who introduce dummy variables indicating the time of 
enforcement of a legislative change. While the strategy of Antoni and Jahn (2009) is informative if 
the effects of a reform do not show up before its enforcement, the approach chosen here allows to 
observe both anticipatory and delayed effects. Reforms are usually preceded by intense political 
debates so that their effects might well be anticipated by workers and employers. In this case, jumps 
in  the  coefficients  also  before  the  enforcement  of  a  new  law  might  be  observed.  A  potential 
outcome of the anticipatory effects of a relaxation of employment protection legislation might be, 
for example, that because these reforms usually affect the new entrants, an increase in the duration 
of first jobs before the reforms is observed. This is because employers would become very choosy 
in hiring, and employees would refrain from quitting their jobs, if the expectation is to hire or be 
hired with shorter term contracts after the reform. By the same line of reasoning, there might well   - 15 - 
be delayed effects, especially of reforms that are small and incremental and, in such cases, jumps in 
the coefficients may be observed after the year of enforcement of a new law. 
Another  complication  occurs  if  there  are  multiple  reforms  in  a  short  period  of  time,  like  in 
Germany. It should be underlined that the strategy chosen does not allow to disentangle the effects 
of each one, and attribute the value of their coefficients to single, specific laws.  
An obvious objection to the outlined approach is that the time dummies could also capture the 
effects of the economic cycle. To deal with this problem, in addition to individual and firm related 
characteristics included in the x vector, local economic aggregate variables, such as the local yearly 
change in value added and the local unemployment rate, are introduced. The hypothesis to test is if 
the changes in labour market regulation that aimed at liberalising the duration of labour contracts 
have generated time patterns in the coefficients of the dummy variables which may be attributed to 
single reforms or periods of reforms.  
 
The second part of the empirical analysis deals with the question of what happens to the new 
entrants when the first job ends within the observation window. The subsequent jobs, their number, 
their duration and the duration of search time is analysed. If the duration of search time is short (less 
than a fixed amount of months), and thus can be considered as frictional, the sum of the durations of 
all jobs is taken as a single employment spell. Then the duration of employment is analysed, again 
using a piecewise constant proportional hazard model specification.  
 
5.3 Sample selection and description of first job duration 
 
The  sample  selection  is  motivated  by  the  idea  of  looking  at  changes  in  job  and  employment 
durations for the whole group of labour market entrants. Some selections are necessary because the 
information in the data is not sufficient to model durations in these cases. The focus is on entry into 
dependent employment. For Germany, "mini-jobs" and for Italy, co.co.co and freelance workers are 
not included in the analysis. In Germany, information on these jobs is missing before 1999, in Italy, 
the timing of payments of social security contributions for these jobs does not necessarily coincide 
with  the  timing  of  employment  which  makes  it  impossible  to  observe  the  exact  employment 
durations. 
“Entrants” are defined as those employees who are recorded for the first time in the archive at year 
t, never observed from date of start of the IAB and WHIP samples (1975 and 1985 respectively) up 
to t. Moreover, in order to minimize the possibility that those observed are not first spells, the 
sample is further restricted to people aged between 15 and 39. For Germany, the skill level is 
measured by the level of education in combination with information on vocational training. The   - 16 - 
sample is restricted to persons having already reached their highest level of education. This should 
exclude periods of employment in which some individuals may be moving back and forth between 
the educational system and the labour market. Also, persons in an apprenticeship or vocational 
training are excluded since in Germany, these are very different from workers in regular jobs
13.  
For Italy, the WHIP data set contains information on the workers ’ skill level, while the level of 
education is not collected. Thus it is not possible to control for the occurrence of transitions back 
and  forth  between  education  and  work.  However,  people  who  enter  the  labour  market  before 
completing  their  educational  careers  are  more  likely  to  experience  spells  of  independent 
employment  (for  example  with  co.co.co.  contracts)  which  are  excluded  from  this  analysis. 
Differently from Germany apprentices and workers with training contracts called “formazione and 
lavoro” are included since they are very similar to the other workers (of the same age) except for the 
level of social security contributions paid by the firm
14. 
 
Graph 1 shows the number of the “new entrants” in the labour market as dependent workers each 
year.  
 


































































































Note. IABS and WHIP results are weighted by inverse sampling ratios. 
                                                 
13 The duration of such training periods is usually between two and four years and is determined by special regulations 
for each occupation. The vocational trainees do not receive a wage, but instead are paid an allowance which is much 
lower than the normal wage. After vocational training, a further employment of a trainee - even if in the same firm - 
requires a new working contract. 
14 Apprentices receive a minimum amount of ext ernal and on the job training and the employer enjoys a  full social 
security contributions rebate. Its maximum duration is 5 years and is not renewable within the same firm. Only 
individuals under 24 years of age can be hired with this contract. 
The training contract “formazione e lavoro” can last a maximum of 24 months and is not renewable within the same 
firm. Only individuals under 32 years of age can be hired with this contract. It provides to the firm from 25% to almost 
100% rebate on the social security contributions; to the worker a minimum of formal training.   - 17 - 
 
In Germany, extrapolating IABS values to the population, about 940,000 new entrants are observed 
on average each year, with a strong seasonal pattern (Graph A.1 in the appendix) and more entries 
since 1996. The majority of entries still occurs after vocational training (Graph A.2) and the number 
of male entrants is higher than the number of female entrants, with a constant differential in entry 
over time. The average age at entry is constant around 24 years. 
For Italy, again extrapolated to the total population, on average about 650,000 new entrants are 
observed each year, with a strong seasonal pattern (see Graph A.3). For immigrant workers, there 
are two peaks contemporaneous to two important regularization laws (Graph A.3). After a drop in 
the early 90s, due to a strong recession that brought the unemployment rate of young people (15-24 
years) from 25% of 1991  to 29% of 1994, the number of entrants shows a moderate increase. More 
men than women enter the labour market, the difference remains fairly stable over time (except for 
some pro-cyclical increases). The average age at entry is slightly increasing over time from a low of 
22.5 in 1994 to a high around 24.7 in 2002. 
 
Turning to the definition of the duration of the first job, a spell is defined as continuous when it is 
an uninterrupted period of employment always with the same employer.
15 A spell might be either 
completed or censored if it ends during the last year of the observation window.
16  
A non-parametric analysis of the duration of the first  job spell shows that its length has decreased 
for several groups over the period under consideration. Graph 2 and Graph 3 show the differences 
in the first job survivor functions of people who entered the labour market  in the first and the last 
year of the respective observation window for Germany and Italy.  
 
The tendency towards a downward shift in the survivor function is especially pronounced in Ita ly, 
where it affects both males and females.  In Germany there is no clear downward trend for men, 
while there is a significant decrease in the average survival probability for women. Interestingly, the 
graphs highlight that women have higher survival rates than men in both countries. Furthermore, 
both in Italy and Germany the tendency towards a reduction in the first job spell seem s to have 
affected in particular female employment. A supply-side explanation for these patterns might be a 
lower degree of job  mobility for women because of family responsibilit ies. On the demand-side, 
occupational segregation and the concentration of women in certain  industries making intense use 
of the “new”, atypical work forms, might lead to a greater loss in job stability for women in the 
period under study.  
                                                 
15 Within a job  with the same employer, a spell that shows interruptions up to 6  months  has been considered as 
continuous to account for the occurrence of missing data, a maternity leave, a sickness period and the like.  
16 Durations are measured in days for Germany, and in months for Italy. The descriptive results are presented in months 
for both countries.   - 18 - 
 
In Germany, both in 1994 and in 2001, roughly 50 per cent of all first jobs for men ended within the 
first 12 months. For women, in 1994, a much lower share of 40 per cent of first jobs ended in the 
first year, whereas in 2001, the respective share was 47 per cent. At the end of the 3-years window, 
about 25 per cent (men, with a slight increase from 1994 to 2001) and 30 per cent or more (women, 
the survival rate falling from 34 per cent in 1994 to 30 per cent in 2001) of all first jobs were still 
going on.  
 
In Italy, in 1990, 44 per cent and 48 per cent of jobs ended within the first 12 months for men and 
women respectively, while 26 per cent of all first jobs were still going on for both at the end of the 
3-years window. In 2000 the share of jobs that ended within the first year has reduced to 39 and 42 
respectively for men and women. At the end of the 3-years window, only 20 per cent of jobs for 
men and women were still going on.   - 19 - 
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5.4 The estimated model of job duration 
 
Turning to the parametric analysis, the same piecewise constant duration model for both countries is 
estimated. The main focus is on the coefficients of the dummy variables indicating the year of entry 
into the first job. These coefficients should reflect whether there have been changes in job durations 
in periods of changes in labour market regulations. The time pieces, instead, should catch the effects 
of duration dependence. They show to which extent the risk of leaving the first job is changing 
during the course of the spell. For the dependent variable, job tenure, negative duration dependence 
is expected, which implies a decreasing risk of losing the first job.  
   - 20 - 
The  estimated  coefficients  are  presented  in  the  form  of  hazard  ratios.  Values  greater  than  one 
indicate a higher hazard ratio associated with that specific covariate, namely, the covariate has a 
reducing effect on the duration of the spell; while values lower than one indicate a lower hazard 
ratio, namely, the covariate has the opposite effect of increasing the duration of the spell. 
 
Table 3. First job duration: hazard ratios of the “year dummies”.  
Germany and Italy, males and females, models with and without unobserved heterogeneity. 
GERMANY  Males  Females 
  model without unobs. het.  model with unobs. het.  model without unobs. het.  model with unobs. het. 
Year of entry  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z 
1995  0.953  -2.37  0.919  -3.20  1.012  0.48  1.014  0.50 
1996  0.970  -1.48  0.938  -2.35  1.010  0.49  1.003  0.12 
1997  1.020  1.06  1.014  0.53  1.107  4.46  1.125  4.40 
1998  0.976  -1.26  0.948  -2.10  1.116  4.85  1.134  4.85 
1999  0.950  -2.45  0.907  -3.52  1.112  4.92  1.130  4.91 
2000  0.980  -0.98  0.947  -1.97  1.166  8.03  1.196  7.87 
2001  0.972  -1.44  0.945  -2.22  1.118  5.30  1.148  5.34 
                 
ln(θ)      -0.41  -7.19      -0.79  -8.24 
No. of individuals  68604        54991       
ITALY  Males  Females 
  model without unobs. het.  model with unobs. het.  model without unobs. het.  model with unobs. het. 
Year of entry  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z 
1991  1.027  1.19  1.025  1.13  0.992  -0.26  0.992  -0.28 
1992  1.027  1.11  1.024  0.99  0.950  -1.59  0.947  -1.69 
1993  1.014  0.48  1.011  0.39  1.006  0.16  1.002  0.07 
1994  0.999  -0.04  0.995  -0.2  0.963  -1.12  0.958  -1.27 
1995  1.112  4.14  1.103  3.84  1.080  2.36  1.071  2.12 
1996  1.146  5.38  1.137  5.07  1.112  3.19  1.102  2.92 
1997  1.150  5.16  1.137  4.73  1.121  3.27  1.110  3.01 
1998  1.053  1.92  1.039  1.43  1.064  1.82  1.051  1.46 
1999  1.091  3.33  1.074  2.74  1.083  2.3  1.070  1.97 
2000  1.035  1.46  1.023  0.96  1.093  2.92  1.084  2.65 
ln(θ)      -18.79  -0.06      -37.64  -0.06 
No. of individuals  45552        29785       
Notes. The reference years are 1994 for Germany and 1990 for Italy. The coefficients are estimated with maximum likelihood using 
the Newton-Raphson method. The specification includes variables at different levels of aggregation (individual and local variables), 
standard errors are therefore adjusted for intra-group correlation. 
 
Table 3 reports the relative risk of exiting from a job spell for workers entering in the labour market 
in each year of the observed period, where the reference years of entry are 1994 for Germany and 
1990 for Italy
 17.  
                                                 
17 For Germany, separate estimations for West and East Germany have been performed. For space reasons and in order 
to not overload the presentation, only the results for West Germany are presented. Also, biographies for persons in East 
Germany are more likely to be incomplete because of the lack of employment information before reunification (see 
section 4).   - 21 - 
 
The non-parametric evidence of the survival curves is confirmed by the hazard ratios of the year 
dummies.  Controlling  for  all  variables,  including  those  capturing  the  local  macro  economic 
performance, in both countries an increase in the probability of ending the first job is observed for 
females.  For  males,  the  decline  is  observed  only  in  Italy.  The  inclusion  of  the  unobserved 
heterogeneity term in the estimated model does not lead to dramatic changes in the coefficients, its 
variance θ being statistically significant only for Germany. 
 
For Germany, the hazard ratios of the model with unobserved heterogeneity are slightly smaller for 
men and larger for women, thus meaning that the changes in duration are even reinforced with this 
specification  as  compared to  the specification  without unobserved heterogeneity.  In accordance 
with the descriptive analysis (Graph 2), for German men there is no clear trend towards shorter job 
durations. Instead, over the years a slight increase in job durations is observed, where only the 1999 
one could be explained in terms of the “reregulation period”. For German women in contrast, there 
is a clear and significant tendency towards shorter first job durations from 1997 onwards, lasting 
until the end of our observation window in 2001. In terms of the timing of reforms, this can be 
interpreted  as  an  effect  of  the  “deregulation  period”  which  is  not  reversed  afterwards.  The 
divergence in these patterns for German men and women might be due to sectoral segregation by 
gender,  with  women  working  more  often  in  industries  making  intense  use  of  flexible  work 
arrangements.  
 
In Italy, the process of reduction in the first job duration occurs likewise for males and females. It 
starts in 1995 and it is visible until 2000, the last year of entry in our observation window, before 
the complete deregulation of fixed term contracts which occurred one year after. Notably, the first 
marked increase in the hazard ratio is in 1995, two years before the Treu law
18. In that year, a major 
legislative change took place, which raised the social contributions to be paid by firms to external 
self-employed collaborators and  reduced the cost gap with respect  to dependent employees  (see 
Section 3). Then, a possible interpretation of this result, is that employers began finding cheaper  
hiring dependent workers instead of external collaborators in jobs that required short time contracts. 
The subsequent enforcement of temporary agency work in 1998, made it convenient to switch, for 
these jobs, that new type of contract, and this might explain why a  break in the decline of job 
durations is observed in this period - the decreasing effect being captured, from then on, by the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
18 Contini and Grand (2009), using the same data set, find similar evidence on this point.   - 22 - 
variable “temporary agency contract”
19. The reduction in durations is larger for females than for 
males in the years 1995 to 1997, pointing to a stronger responsiveness to the deregulation process 
by the weaker segment of the labour force. 
 
Comparing both countries, for males, the changes in the hazard ratios for the “year dummies” are 
opposite in sign, and only in Italy there is a relation to the timing of the reforms. For females, the 
hazard  ratios  point  to  decreasing  job  durations  in  both  countries  and  the  time  pattern  is 
corresponding to the enforcement of laws making the use of short term contracts easier and more 
convenient. In Germany, the reduction in first job durations for females is even more marked and 
lasting than in Italy. 
 
A number of individual, firm and local-macro characteristics are also controlled for (see table A.5 
in the appendix for the list of variables, and Table A.8 and A.9 for the descriptive statistics for 
Germany and Italy respectively). 
Although very similar, the specifications for the two countries show some noteworthy differences. 
For Germany, the level of education is used to control for the skill level. For Italy, education is 
missing in the data, while the skill level is available (three dummies, blue collars, apprentices and 
workers  with  training  contracts  called  “formazione  and  lavoro”,  being  the  white  collars  the 
benchmark). As to the contract type, part-time is available in both data sets; for  Italy also the 
contract with a temporary agency is available. Of course, for this type of contracts a substantially 
higher hazard rate of ending the first job is expected.  
The effects of the cycle are proxied for both countries by the unemployment rate and by the rate of 
growth of value added, at a regional level for Italy and at a district level for Germany. 
 
The results concerning the control variables are worth commenting. The coefficients of the time 
pieces are large and negative in both countries, indicating that the risk of leaving the first job 
decreases for longer durations. Also for many of the other control variables the two countries show 
similar results (see Table A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix
20): significant and strong effects of seasonal 
dummies, significant and strong effects of firm size , with longer job durations in larger firms for 
both men and women; significant effects of industry, significantly shorter durations for  foreign 
workers with the exception of foreign males in Italy, significantly longer durations for higher entry 
ages, strong and significant effects of training and educatio n with a positive relationship between 
skill  level  and  first  job  duration .  Moreover  both  countries  display  different  patterns  across 
geographical areas, with job durations regularly being shorter in regions with high unemployment. 
Thus, the hazard ratios are higher in southern as confronted to northern Italian provinces and also 
                                                 
19 Temporary agency work is in fact controlled for. Temporary agency work contracts as opposed to permanent ones 
have much higher hazard ratios, as expected. 
20 Wages are not included among the regressors because of endogeneity. The specification is a reduced form, and 
therefore all the variables determining wages available in the data set are included.   - 23 - 
higher in German regions and federal states situated in the middle or the north of West Germany. 
Probably  due  to  differences  in  the  structure  and  functioning  of  the  two  labour  markets,  some 
variables produce diverging estimates  for Germany and Italy. German part-timers show shorter 
durations  while  Italian  part-timers  have  higher  durations  than  full-timers
21.  Also,  the 
macroeconomic controls have different effects in the two countries.  They are measured on the 
relatively small district level, with 327 regional units in West Germany and  480 sectoral units by 
region in Italy. The effect of demand (approximated by the change in value added) is positive but 
significant only in Italy,  while  -  conditional on the differences between northern and southern 
regions  commented  above  -  the local  unemployment  rate shows  opposite  signs  in  Italy  and 
Germany. For Italy there is a positive association between the unemployment rate and job duration 
which could be explained by the “insider” theory - the higher the unemployment rate, the higher the 
power of the insiders  and the lower the probability to  leave their jobs.  In Germany, the same 
association is found to be negative but slightly significant. 
 
In conclusion, the comparative analysis yields evidence of a tendency to shorter durations in the 
first  job  in  both  countries.  In  West  Germany,  however,  this  phenomenon  affects  only  women, 
whereas in Italy it affects all entrants. 
As to the relation of these changes with legal reforms, for Italy it is rather plausible to attribute the 
decrease in first job stability of dependent employees to labour market reforms even if the observed 
changes start with a certain degree of anticipation with respect to what is generally believed to be 
the most relevant step towards flexibility - as if the Treu law were legitimating a process that had 
already begun. Also in Germany, where legislative changes have occurred more gradually than in 
Italy and have partly followed a zigzag course, the sensible decrease in job stability observed for 
female workers seems to go along with the intensification of norms easing the application of short 
term contracts.  
 
5.5 Job mobility 
 
The  next  step  is  to  study  what  happens  after  the  first  job,  concentrating  on  the  subsequent 
employment experiences of the new entrants. A first insight into this issue is given by the number of 
jobs held by each individual in the first three years after entry. Graph 5 reports the distribution of 
the new entrants by number of jobs held in the first three years. In both countries, the share of 
workers with only one job spell within three years decreases, while the share of those with three or 
more spells increases. This process is particularly marked in Italy. In addition, in both countries a 
                                                 
21 In Italy part time jobs, although well protected, are scarcely available.   - 24 - 
sort of polarization occurs, since the share of people with three jobs or more increases faster than 
the share of people with two jobs. 
In Germany (Graph 4A), the share of persons with only one job spell goes down from 49 per cent 
for the 1994 entrants to 42 per cent for the 1999 entrants. It increases thereafter up to 45 per cent for 
the 2001 entrants.  
In Italy (Graph 4B), the number of people with only one job drops from 57 per cent in 1990, to 42 
per cent in 2000. 
 
Graph 4. Distribution of the new entrants by number of jobs held in the first three years after 
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The comparison with Germany shows that at the beginning of the period (1994 for this comparison) 
the  share of  Italians who held  only one job  was  much higher than  the  corresponding  share of 
Germans, while at the end of the period the situation becomes more similar. The general impression 
is  that  at  the beginning  of the period, job  mobility was  higher  in  Germany  and that, after the 
reforms, job mobility in the two countries tended to converge.  
 
5.6 The estimated model of employment duration 
 
If labour market entrants tend to change jobs more often and maybe more easily than before, does 
that imply that the chance to be in employment has increased? In order to measure the total duration 
spent in employment, the length of the first employment spell is defined as a continuous period of   - 25 - 
employment composed by one or more job spells (with the same or different employers), with a 
maximum interruption of three months between them.
22 
 
If the duration of the first employment spell  does not decrease after the introduction of less strict 
employment protection rules, this could mean that the probability to stay in employment - even if in 
shorter job episodes  -  has not  decreased  after  the reforms. Such an observation would in fact 
represent a piece of evidence for the existence of a trade-off between job stability and employment 
opportunities. As already mentioned, the detrimental effects of multiple (short) job spells on the 
accumulation of human capital and on the probability to end up in a stable job are left aside (see, on 
this issue, D’Addio and Rosholm (2005), on the risk of being trapped into precarious career paths in 
Europe). The hypothesis of a change in first employment durations in the period under study is 
therefore tested.  
 
An inspection of the number of jobs forming the first employment spell
23 reveals that in Germany, 
the degree of mobility between jobs after entry seems quite large, since around 40 per cent of the 
employment spells are composed of more than one job, of which half of more than two jobs. In the 
period 1994-1999, there is a  slight  tendency towards  an increase of job mobility : the share of 
workers holding more jobs within one employment spell increases and the share of those with only 
one job spell reaches the minimum values of 58  per cent. This trend is inverted in the following 
years, leading to 66 per cent of the 2001 cohort having a first employment spell coinciding with the 
first job spell.  
 
In Italy, the share of one-job spells is much higher than in Germany, around 75 per cent on average, 
and remains fairly stable over the whole period. This confirms the previous evidence of a lower 
degree of job mobility in Italy, and suggests the possibility that the results of the estimated duration 
model will not change dramatically for this country when switching from the first job spell to the 
first employment spell model. 
                                                 
22  A  sensitivity  analysis  shows  that  setting  the  length  of  the  interruption  to  one  month  the  results  do  not  change 
significantly. 
23 Note that one-job employment spells and the last job of multiple-jobs employment spells might be censored or might 
end in unemployment.   - 26 - 
 
Table 4. First employment duration: hazard ratios of the “year dummies”.  
Germany and Italy, males and females, models with and without unobserved heterogeneity. 
GERMANY  Males  Females 
  model without unobs. het.  model with unobs. het.  model without unobs. het.  model with unobs. het. 
Year of entry  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z 
1995  0.999  -0.05  0.980  -0.75  1.040  1.52  1.049  1.52 
1996  0.982  -0.80  0.961  -1.36  1.030  1.09  1.037  1.11 
1997  0.970  -1.23  0.967  -1.06  1.063  2.21  1.098  2.83 
1998  0.861  -7.12  0.826  -6.88  0.986  -0.53  0.994  -0.19 
1999  0.796  -10.91  0.735  -10.92  0.961  -1.58  0.946  -1.83 
2000  0.884  -5.44  0.823  -6.65  1.047  1.69  1.049  1.45 
2001  0.910  -4.25  0.876  -4.65  1.065  2.39  1.087  2.61 
                 
ln(θ)      -0.09  -1.55      -0.18  -3.14 
No. of individuals  68559        54920       
ITALY  Males  Females 
  model without unobs. het.  model with unobs. het.  model without unobs. het.  model with unobs. het. 
Year of entry  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z  Hazard ratio  z 
1991  1.060  2.44  1.064  2.54  1.011  0.33  1.010  0.30 
1992  1.096  3.53  1.101  3.66  1.014  0.41  1.015  0.43 
1993  1.038  1.24  1.033  1.05  1.045  1.13  1.049  1.20 
1994  0.986  -0.47  0.976  -0.82  0.946  -1.50  0.943  -1.57 
1995  1.103  3.55  1.101  3.42  1.069  1.90  1.068  1.84 
1996  1.165  5.55  1.158  5.27  1.084  2.22  1.088  2.31 
1997  1.090  2.90  1.092  2.95  1.085  2.14  1.086  2.14 
1998  0.986  -0.48  0.980  -0.69  0.989  -0.29  0.990  -0.27 
1999  0.978  -0.77  0.976  -0.84  0.972  -0.75  0.982  -0.46 
2000  0.928  -2.89  0.925  -2.95  0.970  -0.92  0.968  -0.95 
ln(θ)      -19.27  -0.04      -18.10  -0.05 
No. of individuals  45552        29785       
Notes. The reference years are 1994 for Germany and 1990 for Italy. The coefficients are estimated with maximum likelihood using 
the Newton-Raphson method. The specification includes variables at different levels of aggregation (individual and local variables), 
standard errors are therefore adjusted for intra-group correlation. 
 
Similarly to Table 3, Table 4 reports the hazard ratios of the year dummies for Germany and Italy. 
In  this  case  the  explanatory  variables  i x   included  in  the  model,  refers  to  individual,  firm  and 
macroeconomic conditions at the time of entry in employment. 
The  two  models,  with  and  without  unobserved  heterogeneity,  do  not  yield,  overall,  extremely 
different results (the unobserved heterogeneity term is here significant only for German females, for 
German males, in contrast to the job duration model, the variance of the assumed distribution of the 
unobserved heterogeneity term is not significant).  
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In Germany, the results reinforce the evidence emerging from the job spell model for males, who 
experience a significant increase in the duration of first employment from 1998 onwards, with a 
peak  in  1999  (the  risk  of  ending  the  first  employment  period  is  20  percentage  points  higher 
compared to 1994 in the model neglecting unobserved heterogeneity). Females do not experience 
clear  changes  in  first  employment  duration  over  time,  with  only  two  significant  and  positive 
coefficients in 1997 and 2001. The hazard ratios are increasing in size after 1999 and because their 
values are greater than one it might be concluded that women in Germany have not compensated 
their decrease in job durations with higher employment stability. 
 
In Italy, the decrease in duration is confirmed also for the employment spells, exactly in the years of 
the reforms, after which there is a tendency to recover the length of the beginning of the period. The 
phenomenon is more marked for males as compared to females. 
 
In conclusion, the results for German males indicate an increase in employment duration during the 
period of labour market reforms, suggesting that the opportunity to switch rapidly from one job to 
the other has even increased. For females, instead, the opportunity to stay in employment does not 
seem to have increased, even if the first job duration has decreased. So, under this respect, the 
reforms might be thought to be not completely successful. The results for Italy, instead, are more 
linked to the timing of the reforms but, at the same time, even less encouraging. The reduction in 
the first job duration has not been counterbalanced by an increase in the opportunity to find rapidly 
another (or more than one) and possibly more stable job. This is true for both sexes, for all years, 
also during periods of important labour market reforms. 
 
6 Conclusions  
 
During  the  late  90s,  both  Germany  and  Italy  experienced  changes  in  labour  market  legislation 
aimed at  achieving more employment  flexibility.  These  reforms mainly  affected newly  entered 
workers,  while  leaving  the  terms  and  conditions  of  working  contracts  for  insiders  largely 
unchanged. 
 
This empirical analysis has documented the trends in job and employment durations of entrants into 
dependent employment in Germany and Italy during the period of these reforms. The job duration 
estimates have yielded evidence of decreasing first job durations for German women and for both 
men  and  women  in  Italy,  whereas  German  men  have  experienced  a  limited  increase  in  job 
durations.  
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The existence of a trade-off between job stability and job opportunities has been investigated by 
looking at periods of continuous employment rather than at single job spells. Only German men - 
for  whom  job  durations  did  not  show  a  downward  trend  -  were  found  to  have  an  increase  in 
employment  durations  over  time,  while  German  women’s  employment  durations  seem  to  have 
remained pretty stable. The rather smooth reforms in Germany seem to have benefitted only male 
entrants, as their opportunities to experience longer first employment periods have, to some extent, 
increased. Instead, employment stability of German women has not improved along the course of 
the reforms.  
 
The picture for Italy is more mixed. The reduction of the duration of the first job observed in the 
mid 90s - even before what is generally believed to be the most important reform, the Treu law, that 
took place in 1997 - has not been counterbalanced by an increase in the opportunity to find rapidly 
another job, since the duration of employment has decreased. After 1997, while job duration has 
continued to decrease, employment duration has just recovered the levels of the early 90s.  
 
In conclusion, the empirical results for Italy imply that the employment stability of the new entrants 
has not improved after the reforms. With the exception of German males, the evidence for both 
countries is of an effect that goes in the direction of decreased job durations in periods of labour 
market  reforms  that  increase  flexibility.  This  effect  is  not  compensated  by  an  increase  in  the 
opportunity to rapidly find another job. This is particularly true for the weaker segments of the 
labour force, like women, and where reforms are isolated, like in the case of Italy. The existence of 
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All entries (age 15-39) No vocational training Vocational training Abitur/equivalent University/College
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
All entries Apprentices Blue-collar White-collar  - 33 - 
Table A.5: Individual, firm and local-macro variables in all duration models 
 
GERMANY  ITALY 
- seasonal dummies  - seasonal dummies 
- local unemployment rate (by district)  - local unemployment rate (by region) 
- local value added growth (by district)  - local value added growth (by region) 
- region (Bundesländer)  - region 
- firm size  - firm size 
- industry  - industry 
- foreign (by nationality)  - foreign (by place of birth) 
- age  - age 
- education and vocational training  - skill (education: not available) 
- part time  - part time 
- type of contract: not available   - temporary help agency contracts   - 34 - 
Table A.6 Germany: Estimation results for job duration and employment duration models 
Models with unobserved heterogeneity  Job duration  Employment duration 
  Male  Female  Male  Female 
Duration  Haz. ratio  z  Haz. ratio  z  Haz. ratio  z  Haz. ratio  z 
0-31 days  0.003  -97.40  0.001  -113.38  0.002  -106.73  0.0004  -97.07 
32-61 days  0.003  -94.46  0.001  -110.43  0.002  -101.20  0.0005  -98.47 
62-91 days  0.003  -90.64  0.001  -106.21  0.002  -96.12  0.0005  -92.57 
92-122 days  0.004  -92.21  0.002  -100.86  0.002  -98.50  0.0004  -93.57 
123-183 days  0.003  -98.14  0.001  -113.59  0.001  -105.74  0.0003  -102.52 
184-365 days  0.003  -90.99  0.001  -119.41  0.001  -100.92  0.0003  -110.24 
366-548 days  0.002  -91.82  0.001  -111.99  0.001  -101.16  0.0003  -104.68 
549-731 days  0.003  -70.68  0.001  -97.09  0.001  -94.32  0.0003  -101.17 
732 days and more  0.002  -68.74  0.001  -95.13  0.001  -98.58  0.0003  -108.89 
Year of entry                 
1995  0.919  -3.20  1.014  0.50  0.980  -0.75  1.049  1.52 
1996  0.938  -2.35  1.003  0.12  0.961  -1.36  1.037  1.11 
1997  1.014  0.53  1.125  4.40  0.967  -1.06  1.098  2.83 
1998  0.948  -2.10  1.134  4.85  0.826  -6.88  0.994  -0.19 
1999  0.907  -3.52  1.130  4.91  0.735  -10.92  0.946  -1.83 
2000  0.947  -1.97  1.196  7.87  0.823  -6.65  1.049  1.45 
2001  0.945  -2.22  1.148  5.34  0.876  -4.65  1.087  2.61 
Month of entry                 
february  1.281  9.57  1.080  3.04  1.379  12.32  1.124  3.20 
march  1.273  9.60  1.291  7.62  1.312  8.34  1.352  6.86 
april  1.188  6.12  1.128  3.88  1.170  5.04  1.188  4.33 
may  1.483  12.03  1.380  8.48  1.477  10.98  1.508  9.27 
june  1.372  11.49  1.255  8.39  1.440  11.25  1.270  6.87 
july  1.353  12.40  1.137  5.06  1.451  13.42  1.084  2.21 
august  1.422  13.01  1.232  7.58  1.502  14.96  1.241  5.61 
september  1.344  11.19  1.218  6.95  1.351  9.48  1.299  7.01 
october  1.284  8.65  1.191  5.97  1.231  5.99  1.166  4.52 
november  1.494  13.66  1.525  10.66  1.412  9.30  1.594  9.53 
december  1.540  10.01  1.440  9.48  1.461  8.04  1.480  7.83 
Local labour demand (district level)                 
unemployment rate  1.007  1.70  1.007  1.67  1.012  2.66  1.016  2.91 
gdp growth  0.879  -0.60  0.973  -0.11  1.178  0.64  0.890  -0.39 
Federal state                 
Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg  1.148  3.34  1.125  3.81  1.169  2.73  1.087  1.83 
Niedersachsen, Bremen  1.134  5.27  1.032  1.00  1.227  7.86  1.086  2.52 
Hessen  0.937  -1.87  0.947  -1.70  0.946  -1.18  0.950  -1.21 
Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland  1.024  0.57  1.010  0.22  1.102  1.74  1.134  1.74 
Baden-Wuerttemberg  0.962  -1.29  0.983  -0.57  0.953  -1.50  1.031  0.80 
Bayern  0.993  -0.24  0.979  -0.57  1.020  0.75  0.996  -0.11 
Firm size (1st job)                 
20-49  0.959  -2.40  1.015  0.85  0.940  -3.59  1.058  2.72 
50-249  0.927  -3.39  0.955  -2.03  0.924  -3.45  1.020  0.70 
250-999  0.825  -8.08  0.792  -9.97  0.873  -5.00  0.873  -5.70 
1000 and more  0.796  -7.59  0.766  -7.41  0.890  -3.40  0.866  -3.70 
Industry (1st job)                 
agriculture, mining  1.104  1.77  1.238  2.77  1.503  6.06  1.733  5.82 
energy, traffic and information  0.825  -4.63  1.091  2.01  0.809  -4.23  1.025  0.43 
manufacturing  0.593  -15.34  0.877  -3.72  0.708  -8.87  1.065  1.53 
construction  0.821  -5.17  0.863  -2.53  1.007  0.16  1.117  1.48 
trade and retail  0.703  -10.77  0.948  -1.87  0.768  -6.91  1.065  1.59 
personal and domestic services  0.908  -2.36  1.297  7.00  1.037  0.79  1.551  10.20 
social and public services  0.689  -10.64  0.744  -10.31  0.853  -3.79  0.852  -4.36 
                 
Foreigner  1.173  5.43  1.222  7.39  1.202  4.81  1.567  11.75 
Age                 
age 15-19  0.955  -2.34  1.007  0.28  1.041  1.85  0.966  -1.10 
age 25-29  0.621  -24.32  0.976  -1.40  0.526  -25.20  1.085  3.48 
age 30-34  0.603  -21.78  0.831  -8.04  0.526  -21.77  0.960  -1.34 
age 35-39  0.525  -15.90  0.558  -10.30  0.488  -11.82  0.571  -8.42 
Skill/Education                 
no information on educational level  1.535  9.40  1.694  13.80  2.328  16.16  2.999  24.20 
no vocational training with at most intermediate degree  1.946  23.09  2.249  26.31  2.088  24.22  3.689  38.35 
Abitur/equivalent; with or without vocational training  0.795  -8.63  0.934  -2.59  0.829  -5.96  1.052  1.38 
University/Technical/Professional College degree  0.555  -18.70  1.016  0.67  0.427  -24.36  1.118  3.44 
                 
Part-time (min. 18h/week)  1.410  10.10  1.325  13.82  1.555  12.99  1.555  16.12 
                 
/ln_the  -0.413  -7.19  -0.788  -8.24  -0.088  -1.55  -0.178  -3.14 
theta  0.662    0.455    0.915    0.837   
Wald chi2  783835.1    642533.3    624442.3    724116.1   
Log pseudolikelihood  -110017.7    -85964.2    -96440.7    -68282.6   
persons  68604    54991    68559    54920   
episodes after splitting  423472    362618    478602    415111     - 35 - 
Table A.7 Italy: Estimation results for job duration and employment duration models 
Models with unobserved heterogeneity  Job duration  Employment duration 
  Male  Female  Male  Female 
  Haz. ratio  z  Haz. ratio  z  Haz. ratio  z  Haz. ratio  z 
Duration of first job                 
1 month  0.058  -63.04  0.065  -42.94  0.062  -46.75  0.034  -47.68 
2 months  0.094  -53.59  0.097  -37.2  0.103  -38.87  0.050  -42.69 
3 months  0.099  -52.11  0.089  -38.12  0.108  -37.83  0.046  -43.62 
4 months  0.083  -54.86  0.076  -39.92  0.089  -40.52  0.038  -45.51 
5-6 months  0.056  -64.09  0.049  -46.96  0.056  -48.46  0.024  -52.39 
7-12 months  0.045  -71.48  0.039  -52.11  0.044  -53.85  0.018  -58 
13-18 months  0.031  -77.24  0.029  -55.16  0.028  -59.75  0.013  -61.78 
19-24 months  0.027  -77.68  0.027  -55.6  0.024  -61.25  0.011  -62.57 
more than 24 months  0.024  -82.41  0.024  -58.64  0.019  -66.04  0.009  -67.23 
Year of entry                 
1991  1.025  1.13  0.992  -0.28  1.064  2.54  1.010  0.3 
1992  1.024  0.99  0.947  -1.69  1.101  3.66  1.015  0.43 
1993  1.011  0.39  1.002  0.07  1.033  1.05  1.049  1.2 
1994  0.995  -0.2  0.958  -1.27  0.976  -0.82  0.943  -1.57 
1995  1.103  3.84  1.071  2.12  1.101  3.42  1.068  1.84 
1996  1.137  5.07  1.102  2.92  1.158  5.27  1.088  2.31 
1997  1.137  4.73  1.110  3.01  1.092  2.95  1.086  2.14 
1998  1.039  1.43  1.051  1.46  0.980  -0.69  0.990  -0.27 
1999  1.074  2.74  1.070  1.97  0.976  -0.84  0.982  -0.46 
2000  1.023  0.96  1.084  2.65  0.925  -2.95  0.968  -0.95 
Month of entry                 
February  1.082  3.02  1.005  0.16  1.014  0.47  0.965  -0.95 
March  1.131  4.87  1.018  0.56  1.096  3.24  0.992  -0.23 
April  1.124  4.42  1.214  6  1.094  3.07  1.181  4.59 
May  1.227  8.03  1.190  5.43  1.177  5.77  1.166  4.29 
June  1.543  19.4  1.415  12.18  1.612  19.59  1.494  12.77 
July  1.685  23.46  1.695  18.7  1.667  20.97  1.746  17.84 
August  1.742  20.01  1.813  17.26  1.670  16.93  1.828  15.95 
September  1.172  6.39  1.091  2.76  1.101  3.47  1.060  1.61 
October  1.153  5.8  1.123  3.72  1.106  3.66  1.078  2.14 
November  1.193  6.81  1.164  4.79  1.152  4.91  1.097  2.56 
December  1.192  5.9  1.300  7.61  1.139  3.9  1.262  6.02 
Local labour demand                  
Regional Unemployment rate  0.986  -3.87  0.984  -3.05  0.994  -1.38  0.991  -1.52 
regional gdp growth  0.750  -2.12  0.650  -1.8  0.644  -2.98  0.712  -1.29 
Skill/contract                 
apprentices  0.922  -3.63  0.809  -9.26  0.898  -4  0.795  -8.3 
blue collar  1.396  18.8  1.257  12.85  1.477  18.98  1.316  13.71 
part time  0.956  -2.11  0.837  -9.94  0.981  -0.84  0.844  -8.5 
training and work (“formazione lavoro”)  0.570  -30.1  0.545  -25.91  0.526  -29.37  0.518  -24 
agency  3.177  21.32  3.356  18.8  1.638  8.4  1.740  7.64 
Firm size (1st job)                 
log(size)          0.969  -9.41  0.982  -4.8 
firm size 20-199  1.014  1.02  1.001  0.04         
firm size 200-999  0.860  -6.19  0.937  -2.29         
firm size > 999  0.622  -15.89  0.723  -10.41         
Foreigner  1.010  0.61  1.151  5.19  0.944  -3.03  1.172  5.37 
Age                 
linear (5 classes)  0.874  -22.87  0.899  -15.19  0.630  -17.5     
15-19              1.205  8.65 
25-29              0.948  -2.47 
30-34              0.880  -4.54 
35-39              0.853  -4.91 
Industry (1st job)                 
Extraction of fuel minerals  2.415  3.04  0.000  0  1.182  0.5  0.891  -0.23 
Extraction of non-fuel minerals  1.064  0.54  0.874  -0.3  1.162  1.21  1.726  9.83 
Food industrie  1.336  9.33  1.569  9.28  1.407  10.1  1.071  1.3 
Textile industrie  1.009  0.23  1.060  1.31  1.048  1.05  1.179  2.49 
Hide and leather industries  1.061  1.36  1.060  1  1.084  1.66  1.087  0.65 
Wood industry  1.079  1.93  0.991  -0.08  1.085  1.87  1.105  1.21 
Paper, printing and publishing  0.802  -4.56  1.020  0.28  0.864  -2.71  0.283  -1.78 
Coke manufacturing and refineries  0.474  -2.47  0.431  -1.68  0.519  -1.96  0.944  -0.56 
Chemical product manufacturing  0.775  -3.94  0.940  -0.69  0.715  -4.38  1.003  0.03 
Rubber and plastics  0.912  -2.02  0.929  -0.99  0.974  -0.52  1.060  0.6 
Processing of non-metallic minerals  0.909  -2.21  0.989  -0.13  1.001  0.02  0.000  0 
Manufacturing and repair of machinery  0.869  -3.89  0.793  -2.84  0.889  -2.87  0.841  -1.81 
Manufacturing of electrical machinery  0.920  -2.58  0.856  -2.82  0.846  -4.42  0.846  -2.55 
Vehicle manufacturing  0.846  -2.74  0.937  -0.56  0.791  -3.34  0.961  -0.3 
Other manufacturing industries  1.217  5.57  1.325  5.03  1.286  6.49  1.441  5.74 
Electrical energy, gas and water  0.504  -3.66  0.517  -2.35  0.466  -3.56  0.623  -1.61 
Construction  1.330  13.99  1.154  2.3  1.391  14.49  1.265  3.3 
Commerce  0.996  -0.16  1.185  4.06  1.001  0.04  1.221  4.05   - 36 - 
Hotels and restaurants  1.780  24.53  2.003  16.32  1.925  25.55  2.195  15.91 
Transport and communications  1.053  1.67  1.240  3.66  1.041  1.15  1.248  3.27 
Financial intermediation  1.177  5.85  1.205  4.26  1.155  4.61  1.167  3.02 
Business services  2.354  19.86  2.153  14.16  2.552  20.35  2.253  13.24 
Other community, social and personal service activities  1.506  10.96  1.378  6.9  1.620  11.68  1.537  7.99 
Region                 
Piemonte  1.037  1.42  1.079  2.44  0.996  -0.15  1.147  3.86 
V Aosta  1.376  3.45  1.334  2.87  1.554  4.57  1.354  2.79 
Liguria  1.119  2.81  1.187  3.46  1.114  2.4  1.279  4.48 
Trentino A A  1.022  0.57  1.159  3.39  1.089  2.06  1.156  3.04 
Veneto  1.147  6.52  1.140  4.93  1.097  3.84  1.125  3.81 
Friuli V G  1.177  4.17  1.177  3.48  1.177  3.74  1.122  2.13 
E Romagna  1.313  12.56  1.412  13.17  1.321  11.43  1.442  12.28 
Marche  1.187  5.03  1.088  2.01  1.237  5.63  1.197  3.81 
Toscana  1.164  5.79  1.212  5.99  1.216  6.73  1.306  7.43 
Umbria  1.091  1.81  1.179  2.77  1.113  1.97  1.369  4.79 
Lazio  1.111  3.56  1.162  3.9  1.272  7.47  1.394  7.85 
Campania  1.128  1.93  1.143  1.5  1.268  3.52  1.408  3.59 
Abruzzo  1.265  6.26  1.163  3.01  1.375  7.77  1.410  6.29 
Molise  1.392  3.92  1.173  1.34  1.594  5.2  1.511  3.27 
Puglia  1.200  3.59  1.230  2.97  1.330  5.2  1.526  5.64 
Basilicata  1.243  3  1.166  1.57  1.425  4.62  1.481  3.77 
Calabria  1.286  3.26  1.352  2.81  1.360  3.7  1.718  4.72 
Sicilia  1.363  4.75  1.372  3.44  1.464  5.44  1.663  5.15 
Sardegna  1.420  5.17  1.498  4.45  1.503  5.56  1.808  6.04 
                 
/ln_the  -18.794  -0.06  -19.692  -0.02  -19.272  -0.04  -18.100  -0.05 
theta  6.89E-09    2.80E-09    4.27E-09    1.38E-08   
Wald chi2  272435.7    184020.3    277645.39    181828.510   
Log pseudolikelihood  -69747.8    -45693.712    -64987.331    -42032.655   
persons  45552    29785    45552    29785   
episodes after splitting  257409    172503    276068    187697   
                 
To improve convergence of the model the specification in some cases is slightly changed       
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Table A.8 West Germany: – 1
st Job Model 
Summary of variables – men & women 
Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Duration*
0-31 days 0 1 0.079 0.270 0.061 0.240
32-61 days 0 1 0.074 0.261 0.058 0.233
62-91 days 0 1 0.061 0.240 0.048 0.213
92-122 days 0 1 0.056 0.230 0.049 0.215
123-183 days 0 1 0.077 0.267 0.070 0.255
184-365 days 0 1 0.159 0.366 0.146 0.353
366-548 days 0 1 0.087 0.282 0.092 0.290
549-731 days 0 1 0.070 0.256 0.076 0.266
732 days and more 0 1 0.336 0.472 0.399 0.490
Year of entry
1994 0 1 0.118 0.323 0.117 0.322
1995 0 1 0.123 0.328 0.115 0.319
1996 0 1 0.112 0.316 0.109 0.312
1997 0 1 0.120 0.324 0.117 0.322
1998 0 1 0.126 0.332 0.126 0.332
1999 0 1 0.130 0.336 0.132 0.339
2000 0 1 0.137 0.344 0.143 0.350
2001 0 1 0.134 0.341 0.141 0.348
Month of entry
january 0 1 0.131 0.337 0.129 0.335
february 0 1 0.121 0.326 0.083 0.276
march 0 1 0.080 0.271 0.055 0.227
april 0 1 0.068 0.252 0.061 0.239
may 0 1 0.057 0.233 0.046 0.209
june 0 1 0.075 0.264 0.080 0.271
july 0 1 0.129 0.335 0.162 0.368
august 0 1 0.098 0.297 0.119 0.324
september 0 1 0.084 0.277 0.092 0.289
october 0 1 0.074 0.262 0.090 0.286
november 0 1 0.051 0.220 0.051 0.220
december 0 1 0.032 0.175 0.032 0.176
Local labour demand (district level)
regional unemployment rate 3.023 20.854 9.479 2.964 9.532 2.943
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Table A.8 (continued) 
Male Female
Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Federal state
Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg 0 1 0.069 0.254 0.078 0.268
Niedersachsen, Bremen 0 1 0.116 0.321 0.119 0.324
Nordrhein-Westfalen 0 1 0.270 0.444 0.261 0.439
Hessen 0 1 0.098 0.297 0.101 0.302
Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland 0 1 0.070 0.256 0.067 0.250
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0 1 0.171 0.377 0.167 0.373
Bayern 0 1 0.205 0.404 0.207 0.405
Firm size (1st job)
less than 20 0 1 0.310 0.463 0.342 0.475
20-49 0 1 0.264 0.441 0.242 0.429
50-249 0 1 0.134 0.340 0.138 0.345
250-999 0 1 0.147 0.355 0.158 0.365
1000 and more 0 1 0.145 0.352 0.119 0.324
Industry (1st job)
agriculture, mining 0 1 0.024 0.152 0.010 0.099
energy, traffic and information 0 1 0.057 0.232 0.038 0.191
manufacturing 0 1 0.289 0.453 0.145 0.352
construction 0 1 0.121 0.326 0.012 0.111
trade and retail 0 1 0.118 0.323 0.164 0.371
business services 0 1 0.196 0.397 0.198 0.398
personal and domestic services 0 1 0.080 0.271 0.117 0.321
social and public services 0 1 0.116 0.320 0.316 0.465
Foreigner 0 1 0.229 0.420 0.161 0.368
Age
15-19 0 1 0.123 0.329 0.144 0.351
20-24 0 1 0.447 0.497 0.518 0.500
25-29 0 1 0.263 0.441 0.221 0.415
30-34 0 1 0.140 0.347 0.096 0.295
35-39 0 1 0.027 0.162 0.021 0.143
Skill/Education
no information 0 1 0.070 0.255 0.060 0.237
no vocational training with at most intermediate degree 0 1 0.128 0.334 0.103 0.303
vocational training with at most intermediate degree 0 1 0.508 0.500 0.528 0.499
Abitur/equivalent; with or without vocational training 0 1 0.117 0.322 0.175 0.380
University/Technical/Professional College degree 0 1 0.183 0.387 0.144 0.352
Part-time (min. 18 hours/week) 0 1 0.069 0.253 0.163 0.370
* spells with durations of 3 years or more are censored
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Table A. 9–Italy – 1
st Job Model 
Summary of variables – men & women 
      Male  Female 
      (45555 obs)  (29790 obs) 
  Min  Max  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Mean  Std. Dev. 
Duration of first job             
1 month  0  1  0.079  0.270  0.088  0.284 
2 months  0  1  0.115  0.319  0.115  0.319 
3 months  0  1  0.101  0.301  0.087  0.281 
4 months  0  1  0.070  0.256  0.062  0.241 
5-6 months  0  1  0.043  0.202  0.038  0.192 
7-12 months  0  1  0.158  0.364  0.134  0.341 
13-18 months  0  1  0.088  0.283  0.089  0.284 
19-24 months  0  1  0.053  0.225  0.056  0.231 
more than 24 months  0  1  0.294  0.455  0.330  0.470 
Year of entry             
1990  0  1  0.129  0.335  0.110  0.313 
1991  0  1  0.106  0.308  0.099  0.298 
1992  0  1  0.088  0.283  0.086  0.281 
1993  0  1  0.065  0.247  0.064  0.245 
1994  0  1  0.068  0.252  0.076  0.265 
1995  0  1  0.081  0.273  0.087  0.281 
1996  0  1  0.089  0.285  0.087  0.281 
1997  0  1  0.080  0.272  0.085  0.279 
1998  0  1  0.083  0.275  0.092  0.289 
1999  0  1  0.099  0.299  0.103  0.303 
2000  0  1  0.111  0.314  0.113  0.316 
Month of entry             
January  0  1  0.114  0.318  0.111  0.314 
February  0  1  0.071  0.257  0.071  0.257 
March  0  1  0.078  0.269  0.077  0.267 
April  0  1  0.068  0.252  0.072  0.258 
May  0  1  0.074  0.261  0.076  0.264 
June  0  1  0.121  0.326  0.113  0.316 
July  0  1  0.126  0.332  0.118  0.323 
August  0  1  0.053  0.224  0.054  0.225 
September  0  1  0.085  0.280  0.083  0.276 
October  0  1  0.089  0.284  0.087  0.282 
November  0  1  0.073  0.260  0.081  0.273 
December  0  1  0.048  0.213  0.058  0.233 
Local labour demand              
Regional Unemployment rate  2.710  28.010  10.046  6.464  9.438  6.109 
regional gdp growth  -0.234  0.396  0.054  0.047  0.058  0.037 
Skill/contract             
apprentices  0  1  0.257  0.437  0.242  0.428 
blue collar  0  1  0.585  0.493  0.433  0.496 
part time  0  1  0.069  0.254  0.198  0.399 
training and work (“formazione lavoro”)  0  1  0.126  0.331  0.134  0.340 
agency  0  1  0.012  0.109  0.011  0.103 
Firm size (1st job)             
firm size 1-20  0  1  0.630  0.483  0.630  0.483 
firm size 20-199  0  1  0.240  0.427  0.228  0.420 
firm size 200-999  0  1  0.065  0.247  0.070  0.254 
firm size > 999  0  1  0.065  0.247  0.072  0.259 
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Foreigner  0  1  0.158  0.365  0.064  0.245 
Age             
15-19  0  1  0.325  0.468  0.281  0.449 
20-24  0  1  0.323  0.468  0.389  0.488 
25-29  0  1  0.190  0.392  0.182  0.385 
30-34  0  1  0.100  0.300  0.086  0.281 
35-39  0  1  0.063  0.243  0.062  0.241 
Industry (1st job)             
Extraction of fuel minerals  0  1  0.00033  0.018  0.000  0.000 
Extraction of non-fuel minerals  0  1  0.0021  0.046  0.000  0.000 
Food industrie  0  1  0.039  0.194  0.048  0.214 
Textile industrie  0  1  0.023  0.150  0.098  0.298 
Hide and leather industries  0  1  0.018  0.131  0.025  0.156 
Wood industry  0  1  0.021  0.144  0.005  0.067 
Paper, printing and publishing  0  1  0.016  0.126  0.013  0.115 
Coke manufacturing and refineries  0  1  0.001  0.025  0.000  0.020 
Chemical product manufacturing  0  1  0.010  0.100  0.009  0.092 
Rubber and plastics  0  1  0.017  0.128  0.012  0.111 
Processing of non-metallic minerals  0  1  0.019  0.137  0.008  0.089 
Metal and metallic products  0  1  0.108  0.310  0.034  0.182 
Manufacturing and repair of machinery  0  1  0.031  0.174  0.011  0.105 
Manufacturing of electrical machinery  0  1  0.044  0.205  0.036  0.185 
Vehicle manufacturing  0  1  0.011  0.105  0.005  0.067 
Other manufacturing industries  0  1  0.028  0.166  0.026  0.160 
Electrical energy, gas and water  0  1  0.002  0.042  0.001  0.033 
Construction  0  1  0.195  0.396  0.020  0.139 
Commerce  0  1  0.137  0.344  0.205  0.404 
Hotels and restaurants  0  1  0.102  0.302  0.158  0.365 
Transport and communications  0  1  0.050  0.218  0.025  0.156 
Financial intermediation  0  1  0.086  0.280  0.160  0.366 
Business services  0  1  0.017  0.128  0.030  0.170 
Other  community,  social  and  personal 
service activities 
0  1  0.024  0.152  0.070  0.255 
Region             
Piemonte  0  1  0.070  0.255  0.078  0.269 
V Aosta  0  1  0.003  0.054  0.004  0.062 
Liguria  0  1  0.024  0.152  0.025  0.157 
Lombardia  0  1  0.186  0.389  0.194  0.395 
Trentino A A  0  1  0.022  0.147  0.026  0.158 
Veneto  0  1  0.098  0.298  0.100  0.300 
Friuli V G  0  1  0.021  0.143  0.024  0.152 
E Romagna  0  1  0.086  0.281  0.097  0.297 
Marche  0  1  0.028  0.164  0.030  0.171 
Toscana  0  1  0.064  0.244  0.071  0.257 
Umbria  0  1  0.014  0.118  0.015  0.120 
Lazio  0  1  0.093  0.290  0.095  0.294 
Campania  0  1  0.079  0.269  0.061  0.239 
Abruzzo  0  1  0.024  0.153  0.022  0.147 
Molise  0  1  0.005  0.067  0.004  0.063 
Puglia  0  1  0.057  0.232  0.052  0.221 
Basilicata  0  1  0.009  0.092  0.008  0.087 
Calabria  0  1  0.023  0.150  0.018  0.133 
Sicilia  0  1  0.070  0.255  0.052  0.221 
Sardegna  0  1  0.026  0.158  0.025  0.155 
  